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UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF THEIR
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Richard A. Mann*
and
Barry S. Roberts**
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many circumstances that make an unincorporated busi-
ness association the most useful vehicle for a given business enterprise.
Generally, tax considerations loom most significantly. In addition,
there are four aspects of any business association that determine its ap-
propriateness for any set of business objectives: control, external liabil-
ity, fiduciary duties, and duty of care. This article will explore the
comparative advantages of the unincorporated business associations
with respect to these four attributes by presenting an overview of their
most salient features. Such an approach will allow those interested in
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forming a noncorporate business association (which receives far less
consideration than it merits and is frequently overlooked by practition-
ers) to select the most appropriate form to meet their particular require-
ments. In addition, those choosing to utilize any of these forms will
have greater understanding of the legal requirements and possibilities
of that mode of transacting business. No businessman should risk his
personal fortune without having been fully apprised of the potential
risks associated with conducting a business enterprise. Despite these
hazards there are numerous situations in which a businessman is best
advised to adopt one of these forms of unincorporated associations.
TABLE 1
BUSINESS ENTITIES
NUMBER
TOTAL
RECEIPTS
NET
PROFIT
1960 1965 1970 1974
PROPRIETORSHIPS 81% 80% 78% 78%
PARTNERSHIPS 8% 8% 8% 8%
CORPORATIONS 12% 12% 14% 14%
PROPRIETORSHIPS 16% 14% 11% 10%
PARTNERSHIPS 7% 5% 4% 4%
CORPORATIONS 78% 81% 84% 85%
PROPRIETORSHIPS 29% 25% 30% 23%
PARTNERSHIPS 11% 9% 9%°V 5%
CORPORATIONS 60% 67% 60% 73%
As Table 1 indicates, the sole proprietorship remains the predomi-
nant form of doing business, while corporations clearly dominate with
respect to gross business receipts and net profits. Nonetheless, since
1960 the partnership form (le., unincorporated business associations,
including joint ventures and limited partnerships) has represented
about 8%1 of all business enterprises. Thus, in 1974 there were
1,062,000 partnerships, compared with 1,966,000 corporations. Partner-
ships tend to be smaller than corporations-50.7% of partnerships in
1973 had business receipts totalling less than $25,000 whereas only
23.8% of corporations earned less than this amount. In fact, 77% of all
1. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 550-52 (1977). All figures in the table are rounded to the nearest percentage
point. 1974 is the most recent year for which figures are available.
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partnerships that year had gross receipts of less than $100,000 com-
pared with 46% of corporations. Furthermore, extremely large partner-
ships tend to be quite rare. Only 1.6% of partnerships had business
receipts greater than $1,000,000 while over 12% of corporations earned
more than this amount.
Three forms of unincorporated business associations are com-
monly utilized: general partnerships, joint ventures, and limited part-
nerships. General partnerships have been used principally in finance,
insurance, and real estate (40%), wholesale and retail trade (18%), and
services (18%). Joint ventures have enjoyed popularity among major
corporations planning to engage in cooperative research; in the ex-
ploitation of land and mineral rights; in the development, promotion
and sale of patents, trade names and copyrights; and in manufacturing
operations in foreign countries.2 Limited partnerships have been
widely utilized for enterprises such as real estate investment and devel-
opment, motion picture and legitimate theatre productions, oil and gas
ventures, and purchases of a single depreciable asset such as railroad
rolling stock
II. GENERAL PARTNERSHIP
A. D§fnition and Formation
The general partnership developed at common law and was based
upon continental Europe's societas.4 The rules governing the form
have been generally codified in the Uniform Partnership Act (U.P.A.)
which all states except Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi have
adopted.' The U.P.A. defines a partnership as "an association of two
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."6 Part-
nerships can be formed without the slightest formality. Consequently,
if two or more individuals share the control and profits of a business,
the law may deem them partners irrespective of how they might char-
acterize their relationship.7 Thus, associates frequently discover, to
their chagrin, that they have inadvertently formed a partnership and
2. For an excellent study of the current uses of joint ventures by large corporations, see G.
YOUNG & S. BRADFORD, JR., JOINT VENTURES: PLANNING AND ACTION (1977).
3. F. KEMPIN, JR. & J. WIESEN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS 285
(1976).
4. A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 143 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
BROMBERG].
5. 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 7 (Supp. 1978).
6. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(l) [hereinafter cited as U.P.A.].
7. See, e.g., Associated Piping & Eng'r Co. v. Jones, 17 Cal. App. 2d 107, -, 61 P.2d 536,
538 (1936); Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, -, 158 N.E. 77, 78 (1927).
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have thereby subjected themselves to the duties and liabilities of part-
ners.
The ease and informality of forming a partnership has its advan-
tages-a partnership can be created without the absolute necessity of
utilizing an attorney. Since a partnership is essentially a consensual
relationship, it is malleable into nearly any arrangement desired by its
members through the use of the partnership agreement. This agree-
ment is a nonpublic contract that should be (but is not always required
to be)8 reduced to writing. When a well-drawn agreement is used, it
can provide almost any conceivable arrangement of capital investment,
control sharing, and profit distribution that the co-partners desire. 9 In
addition, it can provide for continuity of the partnership in the event of
one member's death or retirement. Since liquidation usually sacrifices
going concern values, a provision for continuation of the partnership
upon the occurrence of the many events' 0 that can bring about its ter-
mination is absolutely essential and can be accomplished through a
buy-out arrangement in the partnership agreement.
The consensual nature of a partnership gives rise to another of its
characteristics-delectuspersonae or choice of person. The U.P.A. cat-
egorically states that "no person can become a member of a partnership
without the consent of all the partners."" The intimate nature of the
partnership relationship requires delectuspersonae and the strict fiduci-
ary duties discussed below. 2 The effect of this concept is that each
member's interest in a general partnership is nontransferable. It also
sharply restricts the sources of additional capital, for any, new contribu-
tors must be acceptable to all members of the firm. However, the part-
ners may, by agreement, provide for freely transferable partnership
interests or delegate the authority to consent to such transfers on behalf
of all of the members of the partnership to one or more of the part-
ners.13
B. Control
A partnership is a voluntary business relationship which exists as a
8. In re Foreman's Estate, 269 Cal. App. 2d 180, -, 74 Cal. Rptr. 699, 705 (1969). See
generally A. CoRnlN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 370-484 (one volume ed. 1952).
9. U.P.A. § 18; In re Imperial "400" Natl Inc., 429 F.2d 671, 678 (5th Cir. 1970).
10. For a listing of these events, see U.P.A. §§ 31-32.
11. U.P.A. § 18(g). A partner may assign his interest in the partnership, but this results only
in an assignment of that partner's share" of the profits, without a right to inspect the books or to
have an accounting. U.P.A. § 27.
12. See notes 39-107 infra and accompanying text.
13. BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 43-44.
[Vol. 14:1
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consequence of the parties' intent to be bound in such an association.
By definition they are "co-owners" of the business enterprise.1 4 Each
partner, unless otherwise agreed, has an equal right to share in the
management of the partnership without regard to his capital contribu-
tion or to his share in the profits and losses.15 Given the general inabil-
ity of a partner to transfer freely his interest in the partnership, the
right to exercise control assumes crucial importance.
Generally, the majority of the partners determine and manage the
ordinary business affairs of the partnership. 6 However, the U.P.A. re-
quires unanimous approval for the partners to assign partnership prop-
erty for the benefit of its creditors, to dispose of the business's good-
will, to do any act which would make it impossible to carry on the
normal business operations of the partnership, to confess judgment., or
to submit a particular action to arbitration. 7 The power of any partner
to dissolve the partnership18 represents an additional form of con-
trol-a type of veto power.
As noted above,' the partnership agreement can modify any of
these provisions of the U.P.A. by authorizing less than a majority to
handle ordinary, or even extraordinary, business matters. 20 Given the
consensual nature of the partnership concept, it can be readily under-
stood that the partners should have the freedom to organize the man-
agement of their enterprise in whatever form they desire, within certain
public policy limits.
Also notable is the great degree of flexibility that the courts have
occasionally allowed partnerships in granting creditors considerable
control over the partnership's business operation without deeming the
creditor a partner. The significance of this type of flexible arrangement
becomes particularly noteworthy (and curious) in light of the extremely
limited amount of control a limited partner has over his limited part-
nership, a point discussed below.2' In one landmark case,22 a creditor
lent a partnership $2,500,000 in liquid securities in return for 40% of
the firm's profits up to a maximum of $500,000, with a minimum return
of $100,000. Moreover, the lender had the right (1) to join the partner-
14. U.P.A. § 6.
15. U.P.A. § 18(e).
16. U.P.A. § 18(h).
17. U.P.A. § 9(3).
18. U.P.A. §§ 31(1)(b), 31(2).
19. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
20. U.P.A. § 9(3).
21. See notes 192-211 infra and accompanying text.
22. Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77 (1927).
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ship, (2) to receive information concerning all transactions affecting the
borrowed securities, (3) to receive all dividends and income accruing
from the borrowed securities, (4) to substitute securities of equal value,
(5) to obtain information pertaining to the operation of the business, (6)
to consult on important partnership matters, (7) to inspect the partner-
ship's books, (8) to veto any speculative or highly risky venture, (9) to
prohibit loans, (10) to limit distribution of profits to the partners, and
(11) to demand the resignation of each member of the firm. The court,
relying upon the extensive documentation in the loan agreement, found
'that the creditor had principally attempted to protect his loan and held
that he was only a creditor and had not exercised control over the part-
nership.23 This holding assumes great significance when viewed
against the general principle that anyone who receives a percentage of
a partnership's profits and exercises control may become subject to
partnership liability. 4 If this case represents the absence of control
with a corresponding absence of liability, then creditors who do not
receive a share of the profits but merely receive fixed amounts of inter-
est would seemingly be allowed to exercise virtually unlimited actual
control without being subjected to partnership liabilities.
However, this is not necessarily true, for other cases have inexpli-
cably gone practically to the other extreme.2 5 In one case,2 6 the court
held a creditor liable as a partner where the creditor had furnished
financing and warehouse space to a buyer to enable the buyer to take
advantage of a quantity discount and market structure which greatly
favored early purchases. The creditor did not receive a percentage of
the buyer/borrower's profit but only received interest at the rate of 6%
and compensation for his warehousing. The court, however, held that
the creditor was a partner because it had received a benefit, as did the
buyer/borrower, from the mutual business arrangement in which they
both had shared control.
There can be no question but that the parties had joint
control over this enterprise. This follows from the fact that
United [buyer] initially determined how much to buy but
such determination was subject to Cold Storage's [creditor]
right to determine whether the proposed collateral would be
23. Id. at 223, 158 N.E. at 80.
24. U.P.A. § 7(4); BROMBERO, supra note 4, at 65-72.
25. 1 Z. CAvrrcH, BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS § 5.01(4) (1976) [hereinafter cited as I
CAVITCH].
26. Minute Maid Corp. v. United Foods, Inc., 291 F.2d 577 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
928 (1961).
[Vol. 14:1
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"acceptable." Also, it was provided that in case of pending
price increases, which the court found would offer the oppor-
tunity to speculate on inventory, the parties would agree on
the volume to be purchased.
[W]e think the operation . . . was clearly within the
joint control of the parties.27
Thus, a creditor must use extreme caution in exercising control of
his borrower's business and great care in preparing the documents. As
the first case discussed above indicates,2 the preparation of the docu-
ments can be a key factor in persuading a court that a lender-debtor
relationship is all that has been established.
C. External Liability
The principal disadvantage of the partnership is the degree to
which partners are exposed to external liability.29 External liability
arises in a variety of ways, but for most enterprises the crucial and most
commonly occurring causes of loss are tort and contract liability. The
first results from some act or omission on behalf of the partnership that
falls below the standard of care that society demands of all its mem-
bers. As a general rule that standard is one of reasonableness, but a
trend toward imposition of strict or absolute liability has emerged in
this century.30 Losses from contract liability can occur as a result of
incorrect judgments about market conditions, constrictions in cash flow
that render the firm unable to meet its debt service, as well as a host of
other problems. Each partner must account entirely out of his own as-
sets to third parties (ie., nonmembers of the partnership) for these
losses. Consequently, if the partnership encounters disastrous business
reverses and does not have sufficient funds to pay its debts, each and
every partner is personally liable to the creditors for the full amount of
the debts owing them.3' Similarly, if one partner acting in the ordinary
course of business negligently injures a third party, each and every
27. Id. at 583.
28. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
29. U.P.A. § 15 provides:
All partners are liable
(a) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership under sec-
tions 13 and 14.
(b) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership ...
Section 13 deals with partners' wrongful acts while section 14 addresses partners' breaches of trust.
30. This is particularly true in the areas of products liability and ultrahazardous activities.
See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF LAW OF TORTS 508-12, 657-58 (4th ed. 1971).
31. U.P.A. § 15(b). See, e.g., In re Fowler, 407 F. Supp. 799 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
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member of the partnership is personally liable to that third party for
the full amount of the injury.32
The partners cannot limit their external liability by their partner-
ship contract because this personal liability arises as a matter of law.33
However, the partners may determine by agreement their internal lia-
bility, te., how to share partnership losses among themselves. 34 Exter-
nal liability enables outsiders to hold any or all of the partners liable
for losses initially, while the U.P.A. allows the partners to reallocate
these losses internally in any way they see fit.
The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the
partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement be-
tween them, by the following rules:
(a) Each partner . . . must contribute towards the
losses, whether capital or otherwise, sustained by the partner-
ship according to his share in the profits.35
Accordingly, by an agreed upon sharing of profits or by an explicit loss
sharing arrangement, the partners can distribute the losses in whatever
fashion they choose. This gives a partner who has initially borne an
external liability the right to indemnity from the partnership (I e., the
other partners) for that portion of the loss beyond his internally allo-
cated share.36 Of course, the value of this right of indemnification de-
pends upon the solvency of the partnership and of the other partners.
It also depends upon the partner's properly discharging his fiduciary
duties, 37 as well as his duty of care, 38 both of which are discussed be-
low.
D. Fiduciary Duty
It has long been recognized that partners are bound in a fiduciary
relationship with one another and, by virtue of their business associa-
tion, repose the greatest trust and confidence in each other.
If fiduciary relation means anything I cannot conceive a
stronger case of fiduciary relation than that which exists be-
tween partners. Their mutual confidence is the life blood of
the concern. It is because they trust one another that they are
partners in the first instance; it is because they continue to
32. U.P.A. §§ 15(a), 13. See, e.g., Payne v. Payne, 313 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
33. U.P.A. §§ 15(a), 13.
34. U.P.A. § 18.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. U.P.A. § 18(b).
37. See notes 39-107 infra and accompanying text.
38. See notes 109-147 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 14:1
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trust one another that business goes on.
39
Moreover, nothing less than absolute and utmost. good faith, fair-
ness, and honesty will suffice ° The extent of this fiduciary duty, which
binds all fiduciaries and not just partners, has been most eloquently
expressed by the often quoted words of Judge (later Justice) Cardozo:
Joint adventurers, like co-partners, owe to one another,
while the enterprise continues, the duty of thefinest loyalty.
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punc-
tilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is
unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has
been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to under-
mine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating ero-
sion" of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by
any judgment of this court."
Problems involving the duty of loyalty have usually arisen in situ-
ations involving some form of potential self-dealing. 42 No partner can
favor himself at the expense of the partnership or of his partners, nor
can he place himself in a situation where his interests conflict with
those of the partnership. In addition, he has a fundamental duty to
disclose fully to his partners any business dealing he makes on his own
account as well as all facts which are material to that dealing.43
Every partner must account to the partnership for any
benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him
without the consent of the other partners from any transaction
39. Helmore v. Smith, 35 Ch. D. 436, 444 (1887).
40. Bakalis v. Bressler, I 111. 2d 72, 115 N.E.2d 323 (1953); 1 S. ROWLEY, ROWLEY ON PART-
NERSHIP § 21.1 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as 1 ROWLEY]; I CAVITCH, supra note 25, at §
17.01.
41. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 459, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (emphasis added).
42. The cases dealing with the duty of loyalty of trustees also typically involve self-dealing.
For example, Bogert's discussion in G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (2d ed.
1960) of the trustee's duty of loyalty deals with factual situations in which: (1) a trustee buys at his
own sale; (2) a trustee leases trust property to himself; (3) a trustee purchases trust property at a
sale forced by an encumbrance; (4) a trustee sells his own property to the trust; (5) a corporate
trustee buys or holds its own stock for the trust; (6) a trustee of two trusts sells some property
between the trusts; (7) a trustee accepts a renewal of a lease on trust property for himself; (8) a
trustee lends trust funds to himself; (9) a trustee employs himself to do specialized work for the
trust; and (10) a trustee engages in a competing business. Id. at § 541.
43. Eg., Herring v. Offutt, 266 Md. 593, -, 295 A.2d 876, 879 (1972).
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connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the
partnership or from any use by him of its property. 4
The remainder of this section will outline the contours of this rigorous
fiduciary duty and formulate guidelines for a partner to follow to com-
ply with his fiduciary responsibilities.45
1. Any partner who gains any advantage by fraud, misrepresenta-
tion or concealment of any material fact in connection with a
partnership transaction must account to his partners for his ill-
gotten benefits.
The enforcement of this rule enables partners to entrust the con-
duct of partnership business to one another without fear of exploita-
tion. Accordingly, this proscription would be violated by a partner's
stating a sum larger than he actually advanced in furthering the inter-
ests of the partnership,46 or by his informing the firm of a price for an
asset purchased for the partnership in excess of that which he had actu-
ally paid.47
Moreover, a partner may not purchase for his own interest or ben-
efit a creditor's claims against the partnership.48 If he attempts to do so,
he will be held to have purchased the claim in the name of the partner-
ship and therefore to be entitled only to contribution from his partners
for their pro rata share of the acquisition.49 Thus any discount the
purchasing partner has received will inure to the benefit of the firm.5 0
For example, in one case5 the defendant partner secretly purchased
the building in which the partnership bakery shop was located, thereby
'acquiring not only the right of rental payment from the partnership but
also its good will, since under the terms of the lease the partnership's
good will belonged to the landlord. The court held this to be a breach
of fiduciary duty and decreed that the defendant held title to the build-
ing in trust for the partnership.52
44. U.P.A. § 21(l).
45. See generally Note, Fiduciary Duties ofPartners, 48 IOWA L. REv. 902 (1963).
46. R. C. Gluck & Co. v. Tankel, 24 Misc. 2d 841, 199 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct.), aJ'd, 12 App.
Div. 2d 339, 211 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1960).
47. Gates v. Megargel, 266 F. 811 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 639 (1920); Smith v. Hart,
179 IlM. App. 98 (1912).
48. See Nudelman v. Haimnowitz, 314 11. App. 329,41 N.E.2d 310 (1942), aft'd, 382 Il. 87,46
N.E.2d 33 (1943).
49. Id.
50. However, it should be noted that neither this rule of conduct nor any other prevents a
partner from making a good faith purchase of a partnership asset from a receiver or at a judicial
sale; however, the utmost good faith must be exercised. Evans v. Carter, 176 S.W. 749 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1915).
51. Bakalis v. Bressler, 1 M. 2d 72, 115 N.E.2d 323 (1953).
52. Id. at 82, 115 N.E.2d at 328.
[Vol. 14:1
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Fiduciary duties apply even when the illicit benefit has been ob-
tained during the formation or liquidation of the partnership. 3 The
fiduciary relationship commences with the formation of the partnership
and does not terminate until the partnership is completely liquidated. 4
Furthermore, the presence of "bad blood" or ill will between or among
the partners in no way relaxes the high standards of their fiduciary
duty.55 Moreover, although the U.P.A. requires only that "partners
shall render on demand true and full information on all things affecting
the partnership to any partner,"56 this section has generally been inter-
preted (in accordance with the rule at common law prior to the U.P.A.)
to require the partners to disclose voluntarily any and all information
affecting the partnership, even in the absence of any specific demand.5
Somewhat related to the duty of disclosure in the formation of a
partnership is the possible impact of federal and state securities regula-
tion." Membership in some partnerships, joint ventures, and many
limited partnerships has been deemed a security under the extremely
broad definition of the Security Act of 193319 and under some state
blue sky laws.60 Classification as a security does not of itself require
registration since one of several exemptions from registration may be
available.6 But if none of the exemptions apply, the disclosure of in-
formation to persons purchasing an interest in the partnership must
meet the requirements of federal6" and state securities laws.63 In addi-
tion, even if the security qualifies for an exemption from registration, it
will be subject to the antifraud provisions that regulate the sale of se-
curities.64 These include sections 12(2)65 and 17(a)66 of the Securities
53. Bovy v. Graham, Cohen & Wampold, 17 Wash. App. 567, 564 P.2d 1175 (1977).
54. U.P.A. § 21(1).
55. Karle v. Seder, 35 Wash. 2d 542, -, 214 P.2d 684, 688 (1950).
56. U.P.A. § 20.
57. BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 388.
58. See generally Erwin, Partnership Interests as Securities: An Alice in Wonderland Tour, 9
CREIGHTON L. REV. 310 (1975).
59. SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); Kroungold v. Triester, 407 F. Supp. 414
(E.D. Pa. 1975).
60. See, e.g., UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT § 401(1). This legislation has been adopted in part
or whole by 35 states. See [1977] 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 4901.
61. Among the exemptions under federal law most relevant to partnerships are "private
placements," 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 230.146; "intrastate offerings", 15 U.S.C. §
77c(a)(1I) (1976), 17 C.F.R. § 230.147; and "small issues", 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1976), 17 C.F.R. §§
230.251 -.263.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976).
63. See, e.g., UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT §§ 301, 403.
64. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
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Act of 1933, as well as section 10(b)67 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the rules promulgated thereunder. Furthermore, these re-
quirements do not supplant the fiduciary duties under the law of part-
nership but rather supplement them.
2. No partner shall, without the consent of his co-partners, make a
profitfrom any transaction with theparnershio or with hisfellow
partners.
A partner has an obligation to act for the benefit of the partnership
in all transactions within the scope of the enterprise's business and has
no right to earn a secret profit from any partnership business, including
the purchase or sale of a partnership asset.68 Thus, it constituted a
breach of duty for a partner to retain a secret discount on purchases of
petroleum which he obtained through acquisition of a bulk plant, and
the partnership was entitled to the entire amount of the discount.69
Moreover, where an equal partner received $3,500,000 from the sale of
a partnership asset, he was entitled to assume that the selling partner
had sold the asset for $7,000,000, and the selling partner was under an
obligation to account for the discrepancy if this was not the case.70
Generally, it is not necessary to distinguish a partner's duty of loy-
alty to the partnership from that owed to a co-partner, because their
respective interests and rights are common. 7 1 However, the interests of
the partnership and of the partners do diverge in the fairly common
situation in which one partner attempts to purchase a co-partner's in-
terest.72 Nonetheless, the purchasing partner owes his fellow partner(s)
an affirmative duty to disclose all material information, concerning the
partnership and cannot conceal any fact affecting the value of the en-
terprise.73 If challenged, the sale will be upheld only if it was made in
good faith and for fair consideration, as well as upon full disclosure of
all material information. Furthermore, a purchasing partner cannot
circumvent this rule by employing an "undisclosed agent" 74 to
purchase his co-partner's interest or even by having an independent
third party purchase the interest.75
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
68. See U.P.A. § 21(1).
69. Liggett v. Lester, 237 Or. 52, 390 P.2d 351 (1964).
70. Vogel v. Brewer, 176 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
71. BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 394.
72. Id. at 394-95.
73. Id.
74. A person representing another without disclosing the existence or identity of the princi-
paL RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4(3) (1957).
75. Yost v. Critcher, 112 Va. 870, 72 S.E. 594 (1910).
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In one case 76 two partners operating oil and gas leases had entered
into a contract whereby one partner (the defendant) agreed to purchase
the other partner's (the plaintiff's) interest for $1,500. Shortly thereaf-
ter, the defendant sold the business to a third party for $10,500. Nego-
tiations for this second sale had been initiated prior to the plaintiffs
sale of his one-half interest in the business to the defendant, yet the
defendant had failed to inform the plaintiff of these negotiations. In
deciding that the defendant must compensate the plaintiff for the profit
made in selling the plaintiffs share of the business to the third party
($5,250 less $1,500), the court pertinently stated that the absolute duty
to disclose was upon the defendant since the parties were not dealing
with each other at arm's length.7"
As has been seen, a partner's fiduciary duty mandates that he be
completely honest and fair in dealing with his partners or with the part-
nership, that he disclose all material information, and that he refrain
from obtaining secret profits on any transaction with or on behalf of the
partnership or his partners. Furthermore, the courts will carefully scru-
tinize any such transaction for compliance with these requirements.
This approach contrasts sharply with the hands-off attitude of the
courts toward arm's length transactions, which include the typical busi-
ness transaction between those not connected in a fiduciary relation-
ship. When parties deal at arm's length, they need only be honest and
fair in their representations, but they ordinarily have no affirmative
duty to disclose information unless questioned specifically about a mat-
ter.78 Moreover, in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation, the
courts will not inquire into the fairness of the transaction.79 Thus, the
individual parties remain free of judicial scrutiny to negotiate the best
agreement, absent actual fraud or misrepresentation, that each can pos-
sibly obtain for himself. Partners, on the other hand, cannot deal with
each other at arm's length but must adhere to the stringent standard of
exercising the utmost good faith and honesty.
3. No partner shall make a personalprofitfrom the use ofpartner-
shio property
The U.P.A. provides:
A partner, subject to the provisions of this act and to any
agreement between the partners, has an equal right with his
76. Johnson v. Peckham, 132 Tex. 148, 120 S.W.2d 786 (1938).
77. Id. at -, 120 S.W.2d at 788.
78. J. CALAMARX & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-20, at 288 (2d ed. 1977).
79. Id. at 282.
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partners to possess specific partnership property for partner-
ship purposes; but he has no right to possess such property for
any other purpose without the consent of his partners. 80
A partner who violates this section must account to the partnership for
any such misappropriation.8' Thus, when one partner employed the
partnership's property and assets to realize significant earnings, that en-
tire sum was found to have inured to the benefit of the partnership.
82
4. No partner shall take aparnershio business opportunityfor his
individual benft. 83
When a partner is offered or learns of a business opportunity while
acting in his partnership capacity, he must first allow the partnership
the opportunity to accept the offer.84 He cannot, without first offering
the opportunity to the partnership, divert a partnership opportunity to
his own use or benefit. However, if the partnership refuses to accept or
cannot accept the offered opportunity, the offering partner may take
advantage of the opportunity, as long as his doing so does not violate
his fiduciary duty in some other way, such as by putting him in compe-
tition with the firm. It should be noted that this duty to refrain from
usurping partnership opportunities is generally restricted to those
which the partner learns of while acting within his capacity as a partner
and which are within the scope of the partnership business. 85 Thus the
courts have customarily permitted a partner to utilize information re-
ceived in his capacity as a partner for his own advantage provided that
the information is not used for any purpose within the scope of the
partnership business nor for any purpose in competition with the part-
nership business.86 Nevertheless, partners should be extremely cau-
tious and circumspect in any such dealings.
The following situations illustrate the variety of ways in which a
partner may breach this aspect of the fiduciary duty: a partner in a car
rental agency personally accepting the opportunity to purchase a simi-
lar franchise in a neighboring community, 7 a partner's dissolving his
partnership upon receiving information that a company would award
80. U.P.A. § 25(2)(a).
81. U.P.A. § 22(a), Comments.
82. Deaner v. O'Hara, 85 P. 1123 (Colo. 1906).
83. BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 391.
84. See cases cited in Note, Fiduciary Duties of Partners, 48 IOWA L. REv. 902, 909 nn.51-53
(1963).
85. .d. at 910; 1 ROWLEY, supra note 40, at 534, 537.
86. 1 ROWLEY, supra note 40, at 534, 537.
87. Stark v. Reingold, 18 N.J. 251, 113 A.2d 679 (1955).
[Vol. 14:1
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 14 [1978], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol14/iss1/1
1978] UNINCOPORiATED BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 15
his firm a contract in order to obtain the contract solely for himself,88
and a partner's renewing a partnership lease in his own name and not
the partnership's.89 The last of these factual situations creates the
greatest number of problems. Even when the partnership does not
have an option to renew the lease, the courts have held that the partner-
ship nevertheless has the right to expect that none of its members will
hinder it in its renewal negotiations.90 Any interference by a partner
with this partnership opportunity is a breach of the duty of loyalty.
5. No partner shall compete with the partnership.
A partner cannot, without the permission of his partners, engage in
any other business within the scope of the partnership enterprise. 91
Any profit acquired from a competing or similar business must be dis-
gorged by the disloyal partner together with compensation for any
damage suffered by the existing partnership as a result of the competi-
tion.92 However, a partner may enter into any business not in competi-
tion with nor within the scope of the partnership's business. For
example, a partner in a law firm may, without violating his fiduciary
duty, act as an executor or administrator of an estate, and need not
account for his fees where it cannot be shown that his partnership suf-
fered by his service in this other capacity (e.g., by his lack of atten-
tion).93 This is so even if the partner uses information obtained in the
course of his partnership business to benefit his new business. 94
The troublesome question in this area is whether mere member-
ship in a competing enterprise constitutes a breach of this duty or
whether something more is required, such as active participation in the
other business. Unfortunately, the courts are seemingly at odds on this
question,95 so the prudent course would be for a partner to secure the
consent of all his co-partners before becoming a member of any com-
peting or similar enterprise. Finally, it should be noted that a partner
may properly engage in a second enterprise only if neither firm requires
all of his time.96
88. Williamson v. Monroe, 101 F. 322 (W.D. Ark. 1900).
89. Ferry v. McNeil, 214 Cal. App. 2d 411, 29 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1963).
90. Bakalis v. Bressler, 1 IIM. 2d 72, 115 N.E.2d 323 (1953).
91. 1 ROWLEY, supra note 40, at 533; BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 391.
92. 1 ROWLEY, supra note 40, at 533-34.
93. Metcalfe v. Bradshaw, 145 Ill. 124, 33 N.E. 1116 (1893).
94. E.g., Aas v. Benham, 2 Ch. 244 (1891).
95. See cases cited by Rowley who states that mere membership in a competing enterprise is
permissible. 1 ROWLEY, supra note 40, at 536. But Gf those cited by Bromberg who asserts that a
partner is under a duty not to compete with the partnership within the scope of its business.
BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 391.
96. Murrell v. Murrell, 40 La. 841, 40 So. 841 (1881).
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6. A special conflict of interest problem arises/or the directors of a
corporation which enters into apartnershp.
The corporate directors serve in a fiduciary capacity to their corpo-
ration,97 and, by entering into a partnership, they occupy a fiduciary
role to the partnership as the managers of the corporate partner. Thus,
the corporate directors now stand in a dual fiduciary relationship with
countless possibilities of conflicts of interest arising since a transaction
most favorable to the partnership may not be as desirable for the cor-
porate partner.98
Two possible solutions to this predicament have been suggested. 99
First, the corporation should enter the partnership only as a limited
partner. Second, the corporation and partnership should provide safe-
guards in the articles of incorporation and in the partnership agree-
ment. The first of these safeguards would protect the validity of
transactions between the corporation and the partnership. The follow-
ing provision in the articles of incorporations could serve this purpose.
No contract or other transaction between a corporation
and a co-partner shall be either void or voidable because the
officers and/or directors may occupy a conflicting fiduciary
position because of the corporation's membership in a part-
nership, if.
(1) the contract or transaction was approved in good
faith by all parties concerned after full disclosure of
all material facts as to the conflict and the contract
or transaction; or
(2) the contract or transaction is fair and reasonable to
the corporation and co-partners.'l°
A similar provision should appear in the partnership agreement.
In addition, where authorized by statute, 1 1 the corporation should
purchase and maintain insurance to indemnify10 2 any director or officer
97. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 235, at 457-59 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter cited as HENN].
98. See Note, The Close Association Doctrine Revisited, 16 LOYOLA L. REv. 435 (1970).
99. Id. at 446.
100. This is a modified version of a provision suggested in id. at 448.
101. E.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 145 (1974); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 5 (1953).
102. For example, the Delaware statute provides:
A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any
person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or
was serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of
another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise against any lia-
bility asserted against him and incurred by him in any such capacity, or arising out of his
status as such, whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify him
against such liability under the provisions of this section.
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in a suit for breach of fiduciary duty where he acted-in good faith and
in a manner he reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the
corporation. The use of these devices should protect the directors and
officers sufficiently to permit them to function effectively in an other-
wise delicate situation.
The rigorous requirements imposed by the fiduciary duties of co-
partners invite attempts to relax these standards by agreement among
the parties. Partners may include in their partnership agreement any
provision that is neither legally prohibited nor contrary to public pol-
icy.103 It is well recognized, in the analogous area of trust, that the trust
agreement may allow a trustee to exercise enumerated powers beyond
those generally authorized, to occupy a position with possible conflicts
of interest, or even to self-deal."w There would appear to be no reason
for the fiduciary duties of a partner to be any more restrictive, and
there is judicial authority to this effect."05 Moreover, the U.P.A. ex-
pressly provides:
Every partner must account to the partnership for any
benefit and hold as trustee for it any profit derived by him
without the consent of the other partners from any transac-
tions connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of
the partnership or from any use by him of its property.
10 6
Thus, given the required explicit consent through a provision in
the partnership agreement, a partner could (1) compete with the part-
nership; (2) make a profit on a transaction with the partnership or with
his co-partners (although it is not certain whether the amount of this
profit must be disclosed); (3) withhold information from the partner-
ship or his co-partners except upon demand; (4) use partnership prop-
erty to earn individual profit; and (5) take a partnership business
opportunity for his own use. However, it is unclear whether it would
violate public policy for the partnership to grant a partner an unlim-
ited, as opposed to a case by case, right to usurp any partnership oppor-
tunity for his own benefit that he desires.
In relation to all of the above conduct, it is not only uncertain but
also highly dubious that the law would permit partners to agree to sub-
DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 145(g) (1974).
103. Weil v. Diversified Properties, 319 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1970).
104. "An express grant of authority to a trustee to perform acts which would otherwise be
disloyal has been held to be effective in a number of cases." G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 543, at 583-85 (2d ed. 1960).
105. Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386
(1966); Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 922, 524 P.2d 233 (1974).
106. U.P.A. § 21(1) (emphasis added).
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ject themselves to standards less demanding than those governing an
arm's length transaction. Moreover, the law remains unclear on how
closely co-partners may approach the arm's length standard with their
modifications of their fiduciary duties. In all events, any partner desir-
ing to mitigate his fiduciary duties should utilize extreme care in pre-
paring a comprehensive and clear statement of the agreed upon
relaxation of his duties. He should leave nothing to chance nor to the
mercy of the courts which are manifestly unsympathetic to "undermin-
ing the rule of undivided loyalty"'10 7 for fiduciaries.
E Duty of Care
Whereas a partner "is held to something stricter than the morals of
the market place"' 0 it will be seen that he is held to something less
than the skill of the market place. As discussed above, each partner has
equal rights in the management of the partnership, 0 9 although the
partnership agreement can provide for concentration of management in
one or more partners. As a corollary, each partner owes a duty to the
partnership of faithful service to the best of his ability." 10 Nonetheless,
he need not possess the degree of knowledge and skill of an ordinary
paid agent. I ' The latter has a duty to act with the skill standard in the
locality for the kind of work which he is employed to perform and, in
addition, to exercise any special skill which he has." 2 Furthermore, he
will be liable for losses caused by failure to conform to this standard.'3
On the other hand, a partner must merely manage the partnership
affairs without fraud, culpable negligence, or bad faith.'"' If he does
so, any losses experienced by the firm as a result of his management
will be borne by the firm and by each partner according to the loss
sharing agreement. Since managerial decisions involving either bad
faith or fraud generally result in a breach of a partner's fiduciary duty
as well, these two components of the duty of care will not be discussed
here. 115 In most, if not all, situations compliance with the strictures of
107. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 459, 164 N.E. 545, 546 1928). The full text is quoted
at note 41 supra.
108. 249 N.Y. at 459, 164 N.E. at 546.
109. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
110. BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 395.
111. Id.
112. W. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY § 140, at 235 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 379 (1957).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1957).
114. Note, Fiduciary Duties fPartners, 48 IOWA L. REv. 902, 904 (1963).
115. They have been discussed at notes 39-107 supra and accompanying text.
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the fiduciary duty discussed above should demonstrate the absence of
bad faith and fraud. Therefore, only the remaining component of the
duty of care, culpable negligence, will be discussed here.
In attempting to define the degree of care required of a partner
who manages the firm's business, the courts have used various descrip-
tions including willful disregard,1 6 wantonness,' 17reckless disregard, 118
gross negligence, 119 and culpable negligence. 20 Although not syno-
nomous, each of these expressions seems to require something more
than the ordinary negligence of a partner before he must bear the entire
loss caused by his conducting firm business. For the purpose of this
discussion, the phrase "culpable negligence" will be used to express this
concept.
The courts have yet to reach a uniform meaning for culpable neg-
ligence, having ranged in their definitions from ordinary negligence 12 1
to gross negligence.' 22 The majority view is that it is more than ordi-
nary negligence yet short of gross negligence. 23 Thus a partner does
not assume liability for the loss (but merely his share of the losses per
the partnership agreement) occasioned by his errors of judgment or
failure to use ordinary skill and care in transacting partnership affairs
in the absence of fraud, culpable negligence, or bad faith. For exam-
ple, consider a partner assigned to keep the books whose complicated
system of bookkeeping produced numerous mistakes, resulting appar-
ently from lack of care and diligence. Since these errors resulted sim-
ply from poor judgment rather than fraud and were neither intended to
nor did they operate to the personal advantage of the bookkeeping
partner, the negligent partner was not liable to his co-partners for the
resulting losses.' 24
It should be noted that while many, if not most, jurisdictions 25
have adopted the good faith-culpable negligence standard which allows
a partner a certain amount of leeway for mistakes and faulty judgment,
116. Watt v. German Say. Bank, 183 Iowa 346, 165 N.W. 897 (1917).
117. Charlton v. Sloan, 76 Iowa 288, 41 N.W. 303 (1888).
118. Hurter v. Larrabee, 224 Mass. 218, 112 N.E. 613 (1916).
119. Tygart v. Wilson, 39 App. Div. 58, 56 N.Y.S. 827 (1899).
120. Thomas v. Milfelt, 222 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. App. 1949).
121. Carlin v. Donegan, 15 Kan. 495 (1875).
122. Tygart v. Wilson, 39 App. Div. 58, 56 N.Y.S. 827 (1899).
123. Note, Fiduciary Duties ofPartners, 48 IowA L. REv. 902, 904-05 (1963).
124. Hurter v. Larrabee, 224 Mass. 218, 112 N.E. 613 (1916).
125. State v. Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 154, 21 N.W.2d 480 (1946); Henderson v. State, 199 Miss.
629, 25 So. 2d 133 (1946); Warren v. New York TeL Co., 70 Misc. 2d 794, 335 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1972);
State v. Reddish, 269 N.C. 246, 152 S.E.2d 89 (1967); State v. Barnett, 218 S.C. 415, 63 S.E.2d 57(1951).
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some states still apply an ordinary negligence standard.126 The com-
mentators' 27 generally agree that the modem trend in judicial opinion
is toward the relaxed culpable negligence standard. This development
stands in distinct opposition to the development of the required duty of
care for corporate directors.'2 8 Corporate directors must now discharge
their duties in good faith and with that diligence, care, and skill which
ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in
their personal affairs129-- the common negligence standard.
In addition to exercising due care according to the standard
adopted by a given jurisdiction, a partner should adhere to the follow-
ing principles related to care in management in order to avoid potential
liability to the partnership and to the other partners.
1. Unless otherwise agreed, partners should devote sufficient time to
partnershp affairs.
In the absence of any special provision in the partnership agree-
ment, all partners are expected to render services to the partnership, but
do not receive compensation for these services other than their share of
the profits. 130 The partnership agreement may require that a partner
devote all of his time to the partnership, none of his time, or that he
receive compensation for his services. A partner who fails to serve with-
out an express exemption in the partnership agreement will be liable to
the partnership for either the cost of hiring an employee to perform his
services or for the value of the services he neglected to perform, or
under some circumstances the other partners may receive compensa-
tion for their services. 131 Thus, where one partner in a sales firm failed
to maintain his share of the partnership workload, the other partner
received a credit for his own services in addition to his share of the
profits.' 32
2. All partners should transact partnersho affairs in compliance
with the partnership agreement.
Notwithstanding the conclusion reached above that no partner
acts as an insurer of his business decisions, 133 a partner must bear alone
any losses resulting from acts in breach of the partnership agreement or
126. E.g., Bohrer v. Drake, 33 Minn. 408,23 N.W. 840 (1885); Inre Moore, 134 Pa. 486, 19 A.
753 (1890).
127. E.g., Note, Fiduciary Duties of Parfners, 48 IowA L. REv. 902, 902-07 (1963).
128. HENN, supra note 97, § 234, at 454-55.
129. Id.
130. U.P.A. § 18(f).
131. BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 380-81.
132. Davis v. Spengler, 93 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1957).
133. See notes 123-129 supra and accompanying text.
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from those acts beyond the scope of the firm business.' 34 This is rea-
sonable since the members of a partnership should be liable only for
losses arising from the enterprise they agreed to conduct. Thus, a part-
ner who, in violation of an express agreement not to extend credit to
relatives, advanced money from partnership funds and sold goods on
credit to an impecunious relative was held personally liable for the un-
paid debt.'35 In like fashion, two members of a mercantile partnership
were held personally liable for losses arising from speculating in cotton
futures with firm funds without the consent of the third partner of the
firn.
13 6
The general requirement that partners act within the scope of their
authority also applies during the winding up of the partnership. The
U.P.A. provides that, upon dissolution, "each partner is liable to his co-
partners for his share of any liability created by any partner acting for
the partnership as if the partnership had not been dissolved unless . . .
the partner acting for the partnership had knowledge of the
dissolution." 137 This provision denies the right of contribution from co-
partners to a partner who transacts new partnership business with
knowledge that the partnership has been dissolved.
Partnerships exist as rather fragile forms of business that techni-
cally dissolve upon any partner's terminating his association with the
partnership. 38 This termination can occur by the death, retirement,
expulsion, lunacy, incapacity, or bankruptcy of any member to mention
but a few of the events that can trigger dissolution. 3 A well-drafted
partnership agreement should anticipate these situations by including a
buy-out provision" which would allow the continuation of the part-
nership after the occurrence of any of these events. But if the partner-
ship has been dissolved, each partner having knowledge of the
dissolution must not enter any new transactions on behalf of the part-
nership but must limit himself to winding up the affairs of the partner-
ship and to completing unfinished transactions. 4 ' If he fails to do so
and any liability results, he will bear the loss alone without contribu-
tion from his co-partners.' 42
134. 1 ROWLEY, supra note 40, § 18.0, at 447; BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 274-75.
135. McCoy v. Crosfield, 54 Or. 591, 104 P. 423 (1909).
136. Burson v. Stone & Co., 135 Ga. 115, 68 S.E. 1038 (1910).
137. U.P.A. § 34 (emphasis added).
138. U.P.A. § 29.
139. See U.P.A. §§ 31-32 for a complete listing.
140. For a discussion of buy-out provisions, see BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 509-516.
141. U.P.A. §§ 33-34.
142. U.P.A. § 34.
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3. Whenever possible, partners should transact business after con-
sulting with the other partners.
This injunction becomes more crucial as the business transacted
becomes more extraordinary. Consider two individuals who formed a
partnership for the sole purpose of purchasing and selling a particular
tract of land. Partner A purchased the land on behalf of the partner-
ship after which partner B attempted to sell it. However, partner B
erroneously concluded that the partnership had defective title to the
property and, without consulting partner A, expended funds in order to
remedy the defect in title. Partner B was denied any contribution from
partner A for the expenditure because he had failed to consult his part-
ner with regard to a business transaction, not in the usual course of the
partnership business, but rather which went to the very foundation of
the partnership.1 43
4. Partners should exercise at least ordinary care when acting on
behaf of the firm.
When a partner acts within his authority on behalf of the partner-
ship, he may render the firm liable to third parties as a result of his own
negligence. 1" For example, if a partner operates the partnership's au-
tomobile in a negligent fashion while pursuing firm business and
thereby causes injuries to a third party, that third party may sue the
firm and/or the negligent partner and recover damages.' 45 If the in-
jured party sues the firm alone, the negligent partner must indemnify
the firm for the amount of any judgment. 46 Similarly, if the negligent
partner is sued alone, he must bear the loss alone as he is not entitled to
contribution from the other partners. 147 Even though the liability will
ultimately fall solely upon the negligent partner, the possibility is all
too great that the partner may not have sufficient assets to satisfy the
judgment and that the liability will have to be borne by the other part-
ners. Therefore, prudence dictates that the partnership purchase suffi-
cient liability insurance.
Thus, it behooves all partners who take part in the firm's manage-
ment to exercise due care. They will, at least partially, bear any losses
experienced by the firm, since each partner must contribute to the
losses of the partnership according to his share in the profits or accord-
143. Yorks v. Tozer, 59 Minn. 78, 60 N.W. 846 (1894).
144. This is a consequence of U.P.A. §§ 13, 15. See e.g., Payne v. Payne, 313 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970).
145. E.g., Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 34 NJ. 537, 170 A.2d 241 (1961).
146. I ROWLEY, supra note 40, § 18(0.
147. BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 372.
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ing to any other loss sharing arrangement agreed upon. Further, if the
partner acting for the firm does so with fraud, culpable negligence, or
bad faith, he must assume liability to the partnership for the entire loss
sustained.
F Conclusion
From the above discussion it can be seen that, in spite of varying
standards among jurisdictions, certain basic concepts must be consid-
ered by one wishing to enter a partnership. The partnership agreement
should be explicit in setting forth variations of the partner's right to
control. The potential partner should consider both external and inter-
nal liability, again with the agreement clearly delineating the scheme
for the allocation of losses. The partner should appreciate the extent of
his duties of loyalty and care to other members of the firm. In particu-
lar, the partner must devote all (or the agreed upon amount) of his time
to the partnership business; he must always act within the scope of the
partnership activity for the interest of the enterprise; and he should
consult with his partners when possible in conducting firm business.
III. JOINT VENTURE
A. Defnition and Formation
The joint venture as a mode of transacting business has truly an-
cient roots. Traders from Babylonia, Egypt, Phonecia, and Syria made
use of the form to further their commercial interests. 148 But the concept
of the joint venture as a legal relationship has purely American origins
dating from about 1890.149 While the courts have failed to agree on the
definition of a joint venture, certain common elements have been judi-
cially recognized.
A joint venture is an association of two or more persons
based on intent, who combine their money, property, knowl-
edge, skills, experience, time or other resources in the further-
ance of a particular project or undertaking, usually agreeing
to share the profits and the losses and each having some de-
gree of control over the venture.150
The agreement between co-adventurers need not always be in
148. 2 S. WILLISTON & W. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 318, at 547
n.12 (3rd ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as 2 S. WILLISTON].
149. Id. at 548.
150. Id. at 554.
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writing15 1 and can be inferred from the conduct of the parties.5 2 The
duty required of a co-adventurer will be the standard against which the
conduct of one who finds himself in such an implied joint venture will
be measured. Therefore, it is crucial that a potential participant be
aware of the obligations that can arise from his actions.
Although many joint ventures arise inadvertently, a good number
result from the restriction in the majority of jurisdictions that forbids
corporations from entering into partnerships in the absence of specific
statutory or charter authorization. 153 However, the modem trend in
incorporation statutes 154 avoids such chance formations of joint ven-
tures by permitting corporations to join general or limited partnerships.
In any event, this majority restriction is somewhat illusory as it is ex-
ceedingly difficult in practice to distinguish between a joint venture and
a general partnership, and both give rise to virtually identical duties.
B. Control
For purposes of management and control of the business, a joint
venture follows the rules of partnership.155 However, due to the more
limited duration and scope of a joint venture, a joint venturer is com-
mensurately more restricted in the extent to which he may bind the
enterprise.15 6
C. External Liabili&y
The external liability of joint venturers is in all respects identical
to that of partners, 5 7 with the only distinguishing feature resulting
from the more limited scope of a joint venture. Since each of several
joint venturers has the power to bind the others and to subject them to
liability to third persons in matters which are strictly within the scope
151. See generally A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 370-484 (one volume ed. 1952).
152. 2 S. WILsTON, supra note 148, at 557-59.
153. HENN, supra note 97, at 79.
154. See, eg., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 122(11) (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-1(m) (West 1969);
N.Y. [Bus. CORP.] LAw § 202(a)(15) (McKinney 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1302(18) (Purdon
1967); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 1701.13(f)(4) (Baldwin 1964).
155. See notes 14-30 supra and accompanying text.
156. Within the scope of the venture, the individual joint venturer clearly may bind the enter-
prise. Hobdey v. Wilkinson, 201 Md. 517, 94 A.2d 625 (1953). In that case the defendant venturer
sold houses in a subdivision which was the subject of a real estate development venture, and his
co-adventurers were bound by his act. But where one venturer personally borrowed money from
the owner of a warehouse in which the joint venture stored its goods, and the warehouser assumed
the money was for the use of the venture but it was not so stated, the lender-warehouser could not
recover against the joint venture. J. Abrams & Co. v. Clark, 298 Mass. 542, 11 N.E.2d 449 (1937).
157. See notes 29-38 supra and accompanying text.
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of the joint enterprise, the narrower scope of joint ventures restricts the
potential liability of its members. However, this distinction is one of
degree, and any losses arising from wrongful acts or omissions or busi-
ness debts and sustained within the scope of the joint venture are recov-
erable in their entirety from the personal assets of each joint
venturer. 158
Many joint venturers have successfully limited liability to those
dealing with the enterprise by incorporating the joint venture, forming
in the case of corporate joint venturers a commonly-owned subsidiary.
Regardless of the status of the co-venturers as corporations or as indi-
viduals, the incorporation of the venture will effectively limit the liabil-
ity of the participants to the funds invested.15 9 Of course, this assumes
that the joint venture corporation meets with the jurisdiction's require-
ments for adequate capitalization as well as for operational formalities.
. Fiduciary Duty
The fiduciary duties ofjoint venturers parallel those imposed upon
partners. However, a joint venturer's duty to refrain from entering
competitive businesses is much narrower than that of a partner due to
the more limited scope of a joint venture. A landmark decision 60 con-
cerning the general nature of fiduciary relationships involved a joint
venture that had leased a hotel in one of the joint venturer/defendant's
name. The defendant assumed managerial responsibility over the hotel
and, prior to the expiration of the lease, renewed the lease for his own
purposes. He also leased from the same landlord a larger adjoining
tract. In finding that the defendant held both premises in trust for the
co-venturer/plaintiff, the court relied upon the defendant's use of his
joint venturer status to his own advantage in obtaining both leases in
violation of his duty of loyalty. 16 1 The court reached this conclusion
notwithstanding that the joint venture had no right of renewal and that
the defendant had honestly assumed that with the end of the original
lease the venture had terminated.1 62 To the contrary, the court rea-
soned that the defendant had nevertheless breached his fiduciary duty
158. Mayer v. Sampson, 157 Colo. 278, 402 P.2d 185 (1965) (tort liability); Joseph W. O'Brien
Co. v. Highland Lake Constr. Co., 9 IlM. App. 3d 408, 292 N.E.2d 205 (1973) (contractual debt).
159. HENN, supra note 97, § 146, at 253; Flickema v. Henry Kraker Co., 252 Mich. 406, 233
N.W. 362 (1930) (contractual debt); Cone v. Acme Markets, Inc., 41 App. Div. 2d 409, 343
N.Y.S.2d 765 (1973) (tort liability); Chisnell v. Ozier Co., 140 Ohio St. 355, 44 N.E.2d 464 (1942)
(contractual debt); Schuster v. Largman, 318 Pa. 26, 178 A. 45 (1935) (breach of contract).
160. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
161. Id. at 465, 164 N.E. at 547.
162. Id. at 467-68, 164 N.E. at 548.
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of loyalty by usurping a business opportunity which rightfully be-
longed to the joint venture.'63
As was demonstrated above, liability arising from the external re-
lationships between the joint venture and third parties can be limited
by incorporation of the venture. 64 On the other hand, the effect of
such an incorporation upon the fiduciary duties of the co-venturers is
not as clear.' 65 Under the commonly found statutory rules for corpora-
tions shareholders do not owe each other fiduciary duties. 66 Some
courts have held accordingly that once the joint venture has incorpo-
rated, the fiduciary duty that the joint venturers had previously owed
each other terminates. 67 This conclusion seems to be based upon a
perceived inconsistency between the presence of limited liability and
the continued existence of fiduciary duties. Despite this perception, the
trend in judicial authority appears to be that the joint venture and the
accompanying fiduciary duties survive the incorporation.
68
The majority of jurisdictions thus consider that joint venturers
may limit their external liability to third parties but not their internal
liability for breach of fiduciary duties by the stratagem of incorporating
the joint venture. If the joint venturers desire to terminate their fiduci-
ary relationship, they should clearly manifest this intent and not rely
solely upon the act of incorporation.
As with partnerships, members of a joint venture must render true
and full information of all things affecting the joint venture. 169 The
following illustrates the application of this stricture. Two theatrical
producers entered into a joint venture to produce a play, with an ex-
plicit agreement to share the profits after specified royalties were paid
to the author. One of the joint venturers failed to disclose that he had
an arrangement with that author to receive a share of the royalties and
consequently had to disgorge a pro rata share of the royalties he had
received to his joint venturer.'70
The duty to disclose can become quite troublesome in joint ven-
tures comprised by corporations that engage in identical or similar in-
163. Id at 468, 164 N.E. at 548.
164. See note 159 supra.
165. See Comment, Survival of Joint Adventure Agreements, 7 WASHBURN L.J. 110 (1967).
166. See generally HENN, supra note 97, §§ 235-42, at 457-83.
167. Eg., Jackson v. Hooper, 76 NJ. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (1910); Weisman v. Awnair Corp. of
America, 3 N.Y.2d 444, -, 165 N.Y.S.2d 745, 750 (1957).
168. Campbell v. Campbell, 198 Kan. 181,422 P.2d 932 (1967). See also Comment, Survialof
Joint Adventure Agreements, 7 WASHBURN L.J. 110, 114 (1967).
169. See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
170. Selwyn & Co. v. Waller, 212 N.Y. 507, 106 N.E. 321 (1914).
[Vol. 14:1
26
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 14 [1978], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol14/iss1/1
1978] UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 27
dustries. A hypothetical should serve to suggest the nature and extent
of potential problems.17' Two mining corporations form a joint ven-
ture to extract fissionable minerals from a specific tract of land. During
the early stages of operation, one of the corporations discovers a non-
patentable method of extraction that would prove extremely valuable
not only for the joint venture but also in many of the discovering cor-
poration's other operations. Must that corporation disclose the new
process to its fellow joint venturer? The high level of fiduciary duty
would seem to indicate an affirmative answer. One possible solution to
such problems would be for the co-venturers to limit specifically the
duty of disclosure in their agreement. 72 Another possible solution
might be to incorporate the joint venture at the outset if the jurisdiction
is among those which do not consider that the fiduciary duties of joint
venturers survive incorporation.
E. Duty of Care
As intimated above, the courts have traditionally applied the law
of partnerships to joint ventures.' 73 As a result, joint venturers are held
to the same duty of care as general partners,' 74 subject to the same, if
not greater, possibility of limitation by agreement. The narrower scope
of activities and briefer duration of joint ventures can produce two mi-
nor variations in the duty of care. First, joint venturers may not be
required to devote as much time to the enterprise as are partners, as
they seldom contemplate the contribution of all of the participants'
time and energy.' 75 Second, the narrower scope of the business trun-
cates the authority of associates to act for the joint venture. 176 Conse-
quently, each member must exercise commensurately greater care to
comply with the joint venture agreement. In all other respects, the duty
of care of joint venturers should not differ from those of general part-
ners.
171. This hypothetical is based in part upon one suggested by Professor Berle in Berle, Devel-
opments in the Pattern of Corporate Joint Enterprise, 14 Bus. LAW. 309, 312 (1959).
172. Note, Joint Venture Corporations: Drafting the Corporate Papers, 78 HARV. L. REV. 393,
415 (1964).
173. Eg., Bank of Cal. v. Connolly, 36 Cal. App. 3d 350, 111 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1973).
174. See notes 108-147 supra and accompanying text.
175. BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 189, 192-93.
176. See note 156 supra and accompanying text.
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IV. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
A. Defnition and Formation
The unattractiveness of the unlimited personal liability associated
with general partnerships (and joint ventures) gave rise to the limited
partnership, a form unknown to both English and American common
law. The device had its origins in the commenda which arose in medie-
val Europe,'77 but it did not make its appearance in the United States
until 1822.178
The Uniform Limited Partnership Act (U.L.P.A.), which has been
adopted in all jurisdictions except Louisiana, 179 defines a limited part-
nership as "a partnership formed by two or more persons under the
provisions of Section 2, having as members one or more general part-
ners and one or more limited partners."' 8 ° Limited partnership en-
joyed wide use when corporate charters were not readily granted but
fell into disuse upon the passage of general incorporation statutes per-
mitting wholesale formation of corporations.18 ' However, the past
twenty-five years have witnessed a resurgence in the use of limited
partnerships, with perhaps the most visible utilization occurring in real
estate investment and development. 82
The limited partnership is the least likely of the three forms dis-
cussed herein to be thrust upon unwitting participants, for it is a statu-
tory creation which requires the public filing'8 3 of a certificate of
limited partnership. The certificate calls for information not dissimilar
to that in a corporate charter, but it often requires more frequent
amendments to reflect any changes in the membership or in the capital
contribution of any limited partner. 84
The death or retirement of a general partner has the same effect
upon a limited partnership as it does upon a general partner-
ship-termination of the enterprise 85 unless otherwise provided for in
the certificate. On the other hand, the death or withdrawal of a limited
177. BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 143-44.
178. New York was the first state to provide statutory authorization for limited partnerships.
Act of-, ch. 244, 1822 N.Y. Laws.
179. 6 UNiFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 559 (1978).
180. UNIFORM LIMrrED PARTNERSHIP AcT § I [hereinafter U.L.P.A.]. Section 2 specifies the
required content of the certification and filing procedures.
181. BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 149.
182. Id.
183. U.L.P.A. § 2.
184. See U.L.P.A. §§ 24-25.
185. U.L.P.A. § 20.
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partner does not terminate the limited partnership.' 86 In addition, if
provided for in the certificate, a limited partner may sell his interest,
and the purchaser may then become a limited partner.1 87 Furthermore,
capital may be raised by admitting additional limited partners upon the
filing of an amendment to the certificate.'88 Thus, the limited partner-
ship affords greater continuity, transferability of interest, and capital
raising potential than does a general partnership.
B. Control
General partners are vested with control and management of the
business of a limited partnership. "A general partner shall have all the
rights and powers and be subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of
a partner in a partnership without limited partners" within certain mi-
nor limitations. 18 9 Thus, the one or more general partners of a limited
partnership have almost exclusive control of the management of the
enterprise accompanied by personal liability for all debts of the part-
nership, regardless of their partnership contribution. In fact, a general
partner need not provide any contribution, while a limited partner
must contribute "cash or other property, . . . not services."' 90
As noted above,19' the principal reason for entering such an enter-
prise as a limited partner is protection from unlimited liability for the
debts and obligations of the business association. However, a "limited
partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless . . . he
takes part in the control of the business."'192 Hence, when an individual
agrees to become a limited partner and to accept the associated benefits
of limited liability, he must also relinquish control and management of
the business. Therefore, the crucial question is the extent to which a
limited partner can participate in the management of the business 93
without subjecting himself to the unlimited liability of a general part-
ner. The U.L.P.A. places certain limitations on the powers which a
general partner can exercise without the concurrence of all the limited
partners. 94 At the same time, the U.L.P.A. makes clear that limited
186. See U.L.P.A. §§ 20-21.
187. U.L.P.A. § 19.
188. U.L.P.A. §§ 8, 25.
189. U.L.P.A. § 9.
190. U.L.P.A. § 4.
191. See text immediately preceding note 177 supra.
192. U.L.P.A. § 7 (emphasis added).
193. The U.L.P.A. does not define the term "control."
194. (1) A general partner shall have all the rights and powers and be subject to all the
restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners, except
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partners are extended certain specific rights of the general partner. 95
Moreover, it is generally agreed that a limited partner may serve in
the nonmanagerial employ of the limited partnership without forfeiting
his rights as a limited partner as long as his position does not entail his
"controlling" the enterprise.' 96 Neither section 7 197 (which provides for
relinquishment of limited liability upon taking control of the business)
nor section 4198 (which forbids the contribution of a limited partner to
consist of services) prevents a limited partner from serving as an em-
ployee of the enterprise, but neither section defines "control." One
commentator, in attempting to define the amounts of control that a lim-
ited partner may undertake, has stated that "the important test seems to
be whether a limited partner has the ultimate power and authority to
make important business decisions for the partnership."'' 99 However,
the judicial decisions pertaining to this question do not readily lend
themselves to generalization nor does the above test really resolve the
question as it leaves unanswered the question of which business deci-
sions are "important." The cases leave a great deal of uncertainty as to
precisely where, between the extremes of a totally passive limited part-
ner and one who actually carries on the daily operation and manage-
ment of the limited partnership, a limited partner should be deemed to
have exercised control.
that without the written consent or ratification of the specific act by all the limited part-
ners, a general partner or all of the general partners have no authority to
(a) Do any act in contravention of the certificate,
(b) Do any act which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business
of the partnership,
(c) Confess a judgment against the partnership,
(d) Possess partnership property, or assign their rights in specific partnership
property, for other than a partnership purpose,
(e) Admit a person as a general partner,
(f) Admit a person as a limited partner, unless the right so to do is given in the
certificate,
(g) Continue the business with partnership property on the death, retirement or
insanity of a general partner, unless the right so to do is given in the certificate.
U.L.P.A. § 9.
195. (1) A limited partner shall have the same rights as a general partner to
(a) Have the partnership books kept at the principal place of business of the part-
nership, and at all times to inspect and copy any of them.
(b) Have on demand true and full information of all things affecting the partner-
ship, and a formal account of partnership affairs whenever circumstances render it just
and reasonable, and
(c) Have dissolution and winding up by decree of court.
(2) A limited partner shall have the right to receive a share of the profits or other
compensation by way of income, and to the return of his contribution as provided in
Sections 15 and 16.
U.L.P.A. § 10.
196. 1 CAVITCH, supra note 25, § 39.07[a], at 1088.
197. U.L.P.A. § 7.
198. U.L.P.A. § 4.
199. 1 CAVITCH, supra note 25, § 39.07[2], at 1087-88.
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For example, in one case2°° two limited partners in a farming en-
terprise were held to have exercised control over the business opera-
tions and thus were personally liable as general partners on the basis of
having engaged in the following activities: they determined, over the
general partner's disapproval, what crops should be raised; they visited
the farm at least twice a week; they replaced the general partner who
did the farming with another; and they were needed to countersign all
checks-in fact any two of the partners, general or limited, could sign
checks, hence the two limited partners alone could issue checks.
In another decision, however,20 ' a limited partner who was em-
ployed by the limited partnership as an auto repair foreman, who had
occasionally consulted with the general partner about important busi-
ness transactions and had purchased parts as needed, but who could
neither extend credit nor issue checks, was held not to be liable as a
general partner. The court ruled that a limited partner does not forfeit
the right to advise and consult with the general partner about transac-
tions which the general partner wishes to discuss. 20 2 Finally, a third
case 203 held that a limited partner who had acted as the automobile
sales manager of the limited partnership and who had occasionally
signed checks did not assume liability as a general partner since he had
no power to hire or fire employees, to purchase new automobiles, or to
establish automobile prices or trade-in allowances.
All of this uncertainty has led one author to conclude:
Neither the Act nor the decisions under it are very help-
ful on the critical question of how much review, advisory,
management selection or veto power a limited partner may
have without being regarded as taking part in control. The
resulting uncertainty is probably the greatest drawback of the
limited partnership form.2°
In response to this quagmire, some states20 5 and the Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act206 have altered section 7 to provide greater
guidance for the limited partner in determining what role he may play
200. Holzman v. De Escamilla, 86 Cal. App. 2d 858, 195 P.2d 833 (1948).
201. Silvola v. Rowlett, 129 Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954).
202. Id. at -, 272 P.2d at 290-9 1.
203. Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957).
204. BROMBERO, supra note 4, at 147 (footnotes omitted).
205. ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 9-41 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1707(a) (1974); NEB. RE.
STAT. § 67-207 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. § 88.080 (1973); N.Y. [PARTNERSHIP] LAW § 96 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 69.280 (1971); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.070 (Supp. 1978).
206. REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 303(b). This act has not yet been
adopted by any state. See generally 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 114 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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in the operation of the limited partnership. Moreover, all of these
amended provisions allow the limited partner a certain amount of man-
agerial participation while none require a literal interpretation of the
original section 7. In fact, three of these revisions207 establish a reliance
test providing that a
limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner
unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a
limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business,
and then only to persons who transact business with the part-
nership reasonably believing that the limited partner is a gen-
eral partner.20 8
In support of the propriety of the reliance test is the analysis written by
one of the draftsmen of the U.L.P.A.
The Uniform Act [U.L.P.A.], prepared and adopted by
the Commissioners, is based upon two fundamental assump-
tions;
First: That no public policy requires a person who con-
tributes to the capital of a business, acquires an interest in the
profits, and some degree of control over the conduct of the
business, to become bound for the obligations of the business;
provided creditors have no reason to believe at the times their
credits were extended that such person was so bound.
Second: That persons in business should be able, while
remaining themselves liable without limit for the obligations
contracted in its conduct to associate with themselves others
who contribute to the capital and acquire rights of ownership,
provided that such contributors do not compete with creditors
for the assets of the business. '°
Moreover, all seven variations from the official U.L.P.A. text in-
corporate, without excluding other powers, certain enumerated powers
which are not to be deemed "control" of the limited partnership. These
approved powers include:
(1) the power to advise the general partners;
(2) the power to elect or remove a general partner;
(3) the power to terminate the partnership;
(4) the power to amend the partnership agreement;
207. ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 9-41(b) (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1707(a) (1974); REVISED
U.L.P.A. § 303(b).
208. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1707(a) (1974).
209. 1 ROWLEY, supra note 40, at 551.
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(5) the power to veto a sale of all or substantially all the partner-
ship assets; and
(6) the power to serve in the employ of the partnership.
Although these approved powers may provide some guidance to the
current direction of legal thought, they can not be relied upon by lim-
ited partners in jurisdictions which have not modified section 7 of the
original U.L.P.A. Instead, they must adhere to the current standardless
test which requires, for certain compliance, a nearly totally passive lim-
ited partner. The newly adopted standards may in fact represent an
upper limit to those powers a limited partner may exercise in jurisdic-
tions which have not amended the U.L.P.A., but as yet no court has so
held.
An intriguing case2 "0 presenting a possible way to circumvent this
problem involved a landlord who brought suit for a breach of contract
against his tenant (a limited partnership), the general partner, and the
twenty-two limited partners. The landlord alleged that three of the
limited partners should be personally liable due to the control and
management of the limited partnership they had exercised by serving
as officers and members of the board of directors of the corporation
which was the sole general partner. In holding in favor of the three
limited partners, the trial court accepted their uncontradicted affidavits
stating that they did not exercise control over the limited partnership's
corporate general partner. However, in reversing on appeal, the Texas
Supreme Court perceptively stated:
The defendant limited partners argue that they acted
only through the corporation and that the corporation actu-
ally controlled the business of the limited partnership. In re-
sponse to this contention, we adopt the following statements
in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Preslar in the court
of civil appeals:
"I find it difficult to separate their acts for they were at all
times in the dual capacity of limited partners and officers of
the corporation. Apparently the corporation had no function
except to operate the limited partnership and Appellees were
obligated to their other partners to so operate the corporation
as to benefit the partnership. Each act was done then, not for
the corporation, but for the partnership. Indirectly, if not di-
rectly, they were exercising control over the partnership.
Truly 'the corporation fiction was in this instance a fiction.'"
210. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 517 S.W.2d 420 (rex. Civ. App. 1974), modoed, 526
S.W.2d 543 (rex. 1975).
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Thus, we hold that the personal liability, which attaches
to a limited partner when "he takes part in the control and
management of the business," cannot be evaded merely by
acting through a corporation.211
However, it should also be noted that the court in so deciding neverthe-
less rejected the reliance theory.
Incidentally, Revenue Procedure 72-11 of the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) is consistent with this holding, stating that a limited part-
nership with a corporation as the general partner would only be consid-
ered a partnership for taxation purposes if, among other criteria, the
limited partners do not own more than 20%, in aggregate, of the stock
of the general partner corporation. 12 Thus, the IRS has also focused
upon control and set a conservative upper limit to the permissible de-
gree of control exercisable by a limited partner.
In light of this discussion, a limited partner should proceed with
great caution before exercising control of the partnership if he wishes to
retain his limited personal liability.
C. External Liability
One of the most appealing features of a limited partnership is the
limited personal liability it offers to limited partners. The U.L.P.A.
states clearly that "[t]he limited partners as such shall not be bound by
the obligations of the partnership.' ' 213 However, this protection is sub-
ject to three conditions: (1) that there is substantial compliance in good
faith with the requirement that a certificate of limited partnership be
filed,214 (2) that the surname of the limited partner does not appear in
the partnership name,215 and (3) that the limited partner does not take
part in control of the business. 1 6 As long as the limited partner abides
by these conditions, his liability is limited to his capital contribution, to
which he has a claim subordinate to outside creditors but superior to
the general partners. 1 7
The general partners of a limited partnership have the same exter-
nal liability as a partner in a partnership without limited partners.218
211. 526 S.W.2d 543, 545 (1975).
212. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735.
213. U.L.P.A. § 1.
214. U.L.P.A. § 2(2).
215. U.L.P.A. § 5(2). Limited liability is forfeited in this instance only to creditors who extend
credit to the limited partner without actual knowledge that he is not a general partner. Id.
216. U.L.P.A. § 7. See notes 189-212 supra and accompanying text.
217. U.L.P.A. §§ 16, 23.
218. See notes 29-38 supra and accompanying text.
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The U.L.P.A. makes this explicit by stating that "[a] general partner
shall have all the rights and powers and be subject to all the restrictions
and liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners.
219
The Uniform Partnership Act implicitly provides that "this act shall
apply to limited partnerships except in so far as the statutes relating to
such partnerships are inconsistent herewith. ' 220 However, even this
residue of unlimited personal liability can be avoided in those jurisdic-
tions that permit a corporation to be a general partner.221 This is ac-
complished by forming a limited partnership consisting of a
corporation as general partner and any number of natural persons as
limited partners. Since the corporation enjoys limited liability from the
corporation law and the individuals from the U.L.P.A., unlimited per-
sonal liability has been effectively circumvented.222
With regard to internal liability, the partnership agreement can
provide for virtually any arrangement of loss sharing among the gen-
eral partners and the limited partners. For example, the U.L.P.A. per-
mits a member to be a general partner and a limited partner in the
same partnership at the same time.223 This means that he has the rights
of control and the external liabilities of a general partner but the rights
against the other members with respect to his capital contribution
which he would have were he a limited partner.
D. Fiduciary Duties
A general or managing partner of a limited partnership occupies a
fiduciary relationship with respect to his limited partners. This is a con-
sequence of the U.L.P.A. provision that a "general partner shall have
all the rights and powers and be subject to all the restrictions of a part-
ner in a partnership without limited partners. '224 This fiduciary duty
imposed upon the general partner has extreme importance to the lim-
ited partners since the restricted role that a limited partner may play in
the control225 and management of the business enterprise places the
limited partners at the mercy of the almost total managerial power pos-
sessed by the general partners. In fact, this situation has led some to
219. U.L.P.A. § 9.
220. U.P.A. § 6(2).
221. BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 147.
222. It should be noted that this particular configuration must meet certain stock ownership
and net worth requirements to retain partnership status with regard to federal income taxation.
See note 212 supra and accompanying text.
223. U.L.P.A. § 12.
224. U.L.P.A. § 9.
225. See notes 192-212 supra and accompanying text.
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argue that a general partner in a limited partnership should have an
even greater obligation to the limited partners than a partner of a gen-
eral partnership owes his co-partners.22 6 This argument reasons that
since the relationship between general partner and limited partner is a
close analogy to that between a corporate director and shareholder, the
duties owed by the general partner should be as high. However, appar-
ently neither the state legislatures nor the courts have accepted this ar-
gument, although one recent case seems to have moved in that
direction.227
This landmark decision involved a real estate limited partnership
in which the plaintiffs, six of thirty-five limited partners, brought suit
against the general partner (a corporation) for breach of its fiduciary
duty. The plaintiffs alleged that the general partner had purchased
property subsequent to the formation of the partnership for a substan-
tial profit without the approval of the limited partners. The court held
that the defendant's self-dealing had indeed breached its fiduciary
duty.228 However, the court further stated that the limited partners
could have provided in the partnership agreement for the general part-
ner to make a profit on transactions of this sort, as long as the amount
of profit was specifically stated or could be derived from an express
formulation (full disclosure of profit skimming) and the transactions
were fair. 229 This would have permitted the partners to modify the
fiduciary standard but not to the point of allowing an arm's length
transaction. The court may have imposed this constraint of judicial
scrutiny as to the fairness of the transaction in recognition of the differ-
ence in managerial power of the two groups (general partners versus
limited partners) and the dependence of the limited partner upon the
general partner, thus in effect analogizing the limited partnership to a
corporation rather than a partnership. Consequently, this limitation
might not extend to general partnerships.
A most interesting sidelight of this decision (and another reason
for the judicial scrutiny) appeared in the disclosure of a similar situa-
tion in which a general partner of a real estate syndicate, who was per-
mitted in the partnership agreement to re-sell property he had
purchased to the limited partnership at the fair market value, could
utilize such a provision to his advantage by obtaining an inflated ap-
226. BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 148-149.
227. Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 922, 524 P.2d 233 (1974).
228. Id. at -, 524 P.2d at 238.
229. Id. at -, 524 P.2d at 236.
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praisal. In fact, in this particular case one of the tracts of land in ques-
tion had been appraised by two different individuals during the same
period with one appraisal of $688,000 and the second of $325,000.
Thus, it is understandable that the court, in formulating its test, re-
served the right to examine the fairness of these transactions even when
the allowable profit was to be calculated from an express formula.
Another significant decision 3 ° in this area also involved a real es-
tate limited partnership (the Syndicate) in which five limited partners,
out of a total of 350 partners, brought suit against the four general part-
ners for rent due under a limited partnership lease. The Syndicate
owned a hotel in New York City, and the partnership agreement speci-
fied that the Syndicate was to lease the hotel to a corporation which
was owned by the Syndicate's general partners. The partnership agree-
ment also provided that the lease could be assigned with the approval
of the Syndicate's general partners. Through a complex series of trans-
actions involving other business entities which were owned or con-
trolled by the Syndicate's general partners, the hotel lease was assigned
several times, until the Syndicate was in possession of its own hotel
without a paying tenant.
The plaintiffs sued on behalf of the Syndicate, alleging that the
defendants had breached their fiduciary duty to the limited partners by
approving the assignment of the hotel lease to business entities which
the defendants owned or controlled, and then releasing those entities
from liability. The court stated that such self-dealing would ordinarily
render such releases invalid, but since the partnership agreement speci-
fied that the Syndicate was to lease the hotel to the defendant's corpo-
ration, a certain amount of self-dealing had been contemplated and
authorized by the parties. Therefore, the defendants were exonerated
from any adverse inferences which might have been drawn against
them by such self-dealing, and a trial was necessary in order to deter-
mine whether the defendants had acted honestly and in good faith.
This case is significant in suggesting the extent to which courts per-
mit partners, even in a limited partnership, to relieve themselves by
express agreement of personal liability for breach of their fiduciary
duty. At what point public policy would invalidate such agreement
was not considered by the court. Nonetheless, these facts indicate be-
230. Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966).
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havior that transcends the point which any fiduciary should be allowed
to pass.
On the other hand, it remains unclear whether a limited partner
stands in a fiduciary relation to his general partners. There exists very
limited authority on this question, but it seems to point towards not
placing such a burden on the limited partner.23' Given the severely
circumscribed role in the control of the enterprise allowed a limited
partner, this approach makes sense.
. Duty of Care
As with fiduciary duty, the law does not distinguish between the
duty of care owed by a general partner to a general partnership 23 2 and
that owed by a general partner to a limited partnership. This results in
part from section 6 of the Uniform Partnership Act which provides that
"the act will apply to limited partnerships except in so far as it is incon-
sistent with the statutes relating to such partnerships."
On the other hand, a limited partner owes no duty of care to a
limited partnership as long as he remains a limited partner. As dis-
cussed above, a limited partner may not take part in the control of the
business if he wishes to retain his limited liability.233 Thus, the limited
partner engages in no firm business to which some duty of care could
be applied. Of course, if a limited partner disregards this restriction
(subjecting himself to external liability), he will likely be held to the
same duty of care as are general partners. Furthermore, since the
U.L.P.A. does not preclude a limited partner from providing services as
long as such services are not deemed his contribution to the limited
partnership,234 the limited partner may perform services on a contract
basis.2 31 Under this aegis the limited partner would be an independent
contractor or paid agent and therefore would be obligated to exercise
231. Skolny v. Richter, 139 App. Div. 534, 124 N.Y.S. 152 (1910).
Indeed throughout the whole act, from whatever standpoint it may be viewed, the special
partner so far as concerns his relations to his general partners, is treated as a mere con-
tributor of capital with none of the rights or liabilities belonging to general partners, such
as universal agency, unlimited liability for debts, and a property interest in the firm
name and good will. The element of mutual trust and confidence, which is the keynote in
the relation between general partners, is wholly and conspicuously lacking.
Id. at -, 124 N.Y.S. at 157.
232. See notes 109-147 supra and accompanying text.
233. See notes 189-212 supra and accompanying text.
234. U.L.P.A. § 4. See also note 188 supra and accompanying text.
235. Section 13 of the U.L.P.A. states that "a limited partner may also loan money to and
transact business with the partnership."
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ordinary care.236 However, this type of arrangement courts danger as
the contribution of services in some instance may constitute "taking
control of the business" in the hindsight of a court, with the consequent
forfeiture of limited liability. The general failure of the courts and of
the legislature to delineate clearly the permissible degree of control has
been discussed above 237 and has produced such uncertainty that lim-
ited partners should warily render services to the partnership.
V. CONCLUSION
Businessmen frequently decide to join forces with one or more as-
sociates, usually in order to gain additional (and otherwise unavailable)
capital or expertise. Once this decision has been made, a second and
equally as significant a one must be reached-the form of business or-
ganization which should be utilized. Presently, there are four viable
options: general partnership, joint venture, limited partnership, and
corporation. Which of these forms is most appropriate cannot be deter-
mined in any general way but depends entirely upon the particular cir-
cumstances and needs of the associates. There are a host of factors,
other than tax considerations, that are relevant to this decision, all of
which should be considered carefully before choosing one of these
forms of business organizations. This article has described the compar-
ative advantages of the three unincorporated forms with respect to four
of the most important of these factors:238 control, external liability, duty
of loyalty, and duty of care. A business person should not apriori
choose the incorporated form without fully exploring the benefits of
unincorporated forms of business organizations. Moreover, he should
be fully cognizant of his duties and responsibilities whatever form he
chooses. Since the selection of the appropriate form of business organi-
zation is one of the first and most crucial decisions the entrepreneur
will encounter, it should be made wisely and with all due considera-
tion. This article should provide attorneys whose clients are contem-
plating the formation of a business association a basis upon which an
intelligent and informed choice may be made.
236. W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 140 (1964).
237. See notes 189-212 supra and accompanying text.
238. Tax factors, which are always an important consideration, have not been addressed in
this article.
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